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We  study  the  convergence  of  recursive  least-squares  learning 
schemes  in economic  environments  in which  there  is private  infor- 
mation. The  presence  of private information  leads to the presence  of 
hidden  state  variables  from  the  viewpoint  of  particular  agents.  By 
applying  theorems  of Ljung, we extend  some of our earlier results to 
characterize  conditions  under  which  a  system  governed  by  least- 
squares learning  will eventually  converge  to a rational expectations 
equilibrium.  We apply  insights  from  the  learning  results to formu- 
late and compute  the equilibrium  of a version of Townsend's  model. 
I.  Introduction 
This  paper  studies  the  convergence  of  least-squares  learning  mech- 
anisms  to  limited  information  rational  expectations  equilibria.  We 
study  linear  models  in  which  agents  have  access  to  information  on 
only  a subset  of  the  relevant  state  variables.  The  models  cover  situa- 
tions  in  which  there  are  distinct  groups  of  differentially  informed 
agents.  We  proceed  by applying  to our  system  the  recently  developed 
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"ordinary  differential  equations"  approach  of  Ljung  (1977).'  This 
involves extending  some  earlier results of Marcet and Sargent  (1989) 
to handle  situations  with  private  information  and  hidden  state vari- 
ables. We give sufficient  conditions  for almost sure convergence  to a 
limited  information  rational  expectations  equilibrium  and  describe 
necessary conditions  for  local convergence. 
Our conditions  for convergence  restrict an operator  that maps a set 
of  perceived  vector  autoregressions  into  a set of  actual  (or optimal) 
vector autoregressions.  This  operator  is determined  by the particular 
economic  model  in hand.  The  operator  is related to but distinct from 
the operator  governing  convergence  in the class of models  studied  in 
Marcet and Sargent  (1989).  The  presence  of private information  and 
hidden  state variables alters the relevant operator,  in essence  by com- 
posing  the  key  operator  in  Marcet  and  Sargent  with  another  "pro- 
jection"  operator. 
Section  II describes a class of models  with limited and private infor- 
mation and asserts a convergence  proposition  for least-squares learn- 
ing mechanisms.2  Section  III applies  our  framework  in order  to for- 
mulate  and  compute  the  equilibrium  of  a  version  of  Townsend's 
(1983)  model.  In his model,  firms with private information  face signal 
extraction  problems  involving  endogenous  variables  whose  laws of 
motion  are  themselves  determined  by  the  solutions  of  those  signal 
extraction  problems.  Models with structures like Townsend's  (see also 
Lucas  1975)  have  proved  to  be  difficult  to  formulate  in  ways  that 
facilitate computing  their equilibria. The  purpose  of Section  III is to 
show how our results on convergence  of least-squares learning  can be 
used  to help  in formulating  these  models  and  to suggest  alternative 
tractable algorithms  for computing  their equilibria. 
II.  The  Model  and  a Convergence  Proposition 
There is an n X 1 state vector z,. Let z,, be any n,  X 1 vector z,,  =  eiz, 
where  1 cni  '  71 and ei are selector  matrices  for i =  a, b, c, and  d. 
' The  ordinary  differential  equations  approach  is described  and  applied  by LjuLng 
and  Sdderstr6m  (1983)  and  Goodwin  and  Sin  (1984).  See  also  Kushner  and  Clark 
(1978).  Woodf'ord  (1986)  applies  some  of' LjuLng's  methods  to  a  nonlinear  dynamic 
model. 
2  Bray's (1982)  model  and a version  of' Frydman's (1982)  model  are members  of' the 
class of' models  described  in Sec.  II. Analyses  of' these  models  are contained  in Marcet 
and Sargent (I 987).  Papers about least-squares learning  in models  without hidden  state 
variables  include  Bray  and  Savin  (1986)  and  Fourgeauid,  Gourieroux,  and  Pradel 
(1986).  Marcet and  Sargent  (1988)  present  an  informal  interpretative  survey  of' the 
literature  on  least-squares  learning. 
'  The  ability to compute  the  equilibria  of' these  models  rapidly  would  contribute  to 
their being econometrically  tractable. It is probably true that the technical difficulties  in 
computing  the equilibria of' models  of' the style of' Lucas (1975)  and Townsend  (1983) 
have impeded  their adoption  by other  researchers. 1308  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
There  are  two  types  of  agents,  types  a  and  b, who  observe  z,  =  e,Cz, 
and  Zbt  =  ebzt,  respectively,  possibly  distinct  subvectors  of  zt.  Agents  of 
type  want  to predict  future  values  of  possibly  distinct  subvectors  Zk(,) 
=  ek( ,)Z,,  where  k(a)  =  c and  k(b)  =  d, and  use  the  current  observation 
on  z(  , in order  to form  those  predictions.  The  selection  matrices  e,  eb, 
en, and  el  are  constant  through  time.  There  is an economic  model  that 
maps  beliefs  of  agents  a  and  b into  actual  outcomes  in  the  following 
way.  If  the  beliefs  of  agents  of  type  a  and  type  b were  given  by  the 
time-invariant  rules 
E*(z,  lz,(t-  I)  =  IPZat-  1, 
E*(zdt |Zl-  l)  =  bZbt,-  I  for  all  t, 
then  the  actual  law  of  motion  zt  would  be  given  by 
Zt =  T(O)z,-  I  +  V(P)Et,  (2) 
where  Et is an  m  x  1 vector  white  noise  with  EEtE' =  Q.,(I  =  (Isa,  ib), 
and  T and  V are  operators  that  map  matrices  into  matrices  conform- 
able  to  the  objects  they  operate  on.  A  particular  economic  model  will 
determine  the  operators  T and  V.  In  the  next  section,  we  describe  a 
version  of  Townsend's  model  and  display  the  operators  T and  V that 
are  associated  with  it. 
We  are  interested  in regions  of  the  parameter  space  P for  which  (2) 
implies  that  z,  is  a  covariance  stationary  stochastic  process.  For  this 
purpose,  we  define  the  following  set: 
D,  =P I{the  operators  T(13) and  V(Pi) are 
well  defined,  and  the  eigenvalues  of  T(I) 
are  less  than  unity  in  modulus}. 
For  P E  D,,  (2)  generates  a  covariance  stationary  stochastic  process, 
for  which  the  second-moment  matrix  Eztzt  is well  defined.  The  matrix 
Mz(P)  =  Ez,z  satisfies  the  discrete  Lyapunov  equation 
Mz(P)  =  T(P)Mz(P)T(P)'  +  V(jB)QV(P)'.  (3) 
A variety  of  algorithms  are  available  for  solving  (3)  for  Mz(B).  We  use 
the  following  notation  for  some  submatrices  of  Ezz,': 
Mz (PB) =Eztz',  /  a,  b, 
MZj  z(P)  =  Ez1zr,  j  a, b. 
In  general,  each  of  these  moment  matrices  is a function  of  r. 
If the  actual  law  of  motion  for  z1 is (2),  then  it can  be  calculated  that 
the  linear  least-squares  projection  of  Zk(_j)t  on  z.,_  I is given  by 
E(Z(zL  ;s  >Iz  E.t O  =  S  (BP  z +  .  (4) LEAST-SQUARES  LEARNING  1309 
where 
S,(f)  =  ek(,)T(P)[Mz(I)-'Mzjz()]',  for]  =  a,  b.  (5) 
The  operators  S,( a)  map  the  perceptions  If =  (W, ib) into the  pro- 
jection  coefficients  (S(,(P),  Sb(P)).  Let us define  S(W)  =  (S,(P),  Sb(1)). 
We now advance  the  following  definition. 
DEFINITION.  A  rational  expectations  equilibrium  with  asymmetric 
private information  is a  matrix I  (it,  Iub)  that satisfies  "  S(IB). 
Thus  a  rational  expectations  equilibrium  is  a  fixed  point  of  the 
mapping  S.  Let  us  denote  such  an  equilibrium  I  _. Notice  that  this 
concept  of  a rational  expectations  equilibrium  is relative to the fixed 
information  sets zt-  I and  Zb-  I  specified  by the  model  builder. 
We now describe the model  of learning.  ForJ =  a, b, we let {?ltf} be a 
positive,  nondecreasing  sequence  with  limt.  cyt  =  1.  Beliefs  of 
agents  of  type j  (=  a,  b) evolve  according  to  the  following  scheme. 
Define  Pt  and  Rft by 
jt  =  Fist-  l  +  (  I'  )R7.  I{Zjt-2[Zk(j)t-I  -  Zt-2]  }, 
R  =  Rjl  +  (  c  -  )(z1t  lt  1  Rf  l  )-  (6a) 
Let D2J C D1, C  RlkjX(fl1  )  ,j  a, b.  The  algorithm  generating  beliefs at 
t is then 
(Ii,,,  R_  pit,  R1.)  if (13,t,  R  ,t) &  (6b 
some  value  in D2j  if( 
J.,  R,)5tD11. 
Two  distinct  sets,  DI,  and  DC2  ,  are  used  in  defining  the  projection 
facility in order  to  properly  invoke  some  technical  arguments  made 
by Ljung (1977).  In practice, we shall be free to choose D21  to be a set 
contained  within but arbitrarily close to DI1. In the applications below, 
we shall always think of D2J as being  arbitrarily close  to D1J  and shall 
thus focus  our  attention  on  specification  of  the  set DI1.4 
If D2,  =  DI  -  R1k,)X(1/),  then  the "projection  facility" on the sec- 
ond  branch of  (6b) is never  invoked,  and  with suitable  initial condi- 
tions,  (6a)-(6b)  simply  become  a recursive  version  of  weighted  least 
squares: 
In the special case that {a;,} =  {1}, the formula  above is just  ordinary 
^ Ljung  and  S6derstr6m  (1983)  frequently  proceed  in  this  way,  specifying  a  pro- 
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least  squares.  In  cases  in  which  a nontrivial  projection  facility  is speci- 
fied  by  choosing  DI1  to  be  a  proper  subset  of  IR  ?X(Ti),  it  is  natural  to 
set  "some  point  in  D2 " in  (6b)  equal  to  (I?t'  R.,,),  where  t'  is the  last 
time  that  (Pi,,  R11) E  D21. With  D21 set  arbitrarily  close  to DI,  (6)  then 
amounts  to  least  squares  adjusted  sequentially  to  ignore  observations 
that  threaten  to  drive  (,(  R-,)  outside  of  the  set  DI_. When  the  se- 
quence  {cyt} is chosen  to  be  strictly  increasing,  it leads  to adjusting  the 
least-squares  algorithm  to  weight  more  recent  observations  more 
heavily.  (The  restriction  that  limbo  c=,  1 restricts  the  eventual  rate 
of  forgetting  in  a  way  sufficient  to  permit  convergence  of  j  within 
the  system  to  be  studied  below.) 
The  sets  D1J and  D21 will  play  important  roles  in  one  part  of  the 
proposition  to  be  stated  below.  One  role  of  the  sets  DI1 and  D21 can  be 
to  force  the  learning  algorithm  to  remain  within  the  set  D,  defined 
above. 
We  assume  that  when  agents  are  learning  according  to  (6),  the 
actual  law of  motion  is determined  by substituting  P,  =  (IL, PO) from 
(6)  for  IP  on  the  right  side  of  (2): 
Z.  =  T(Pt  1)ztI  +  V(Pt  I)E,.  (7) 
The  system  that  we  want  to  study  is  (6)  and  (7). 
Associated  with  the  system  of  stochastic  difference  equations  (6) 
and  (7)  is  the  following  ordinary  differential  equation: 
I  [R'M 
(~)[SbPj~  -8  dt  R(,  MR  (P)  -  R  (,8) 
dt  -Rf  Rl'MZb(I [Sb(I9)  -ah~]  (8 
[Rb  L  Mz,(P)  -  Rb 
Defining  R  =  (R,1  R,,),  we  can  represent  (8)  in  the  vector  form 
d  (col(I))  -g(P,  R), 
where  col(d)  is a vector  obtained  by  stacking  columns  of  R  on  top  of 
each  other,  and  col(R)  is a vector  obtained  by  stacking  columns  of  R 
on  top  of  each  other.  For  the  purpose  of  studying  the  linear  approxi- 
mations  that  govern  the  local  behavior  of  (8),  we  define 
_d  h (P  R)  dgolPco  R  R). 
Let  {(P(t),  )},e1,  denote  the  trajectories  of  (8).  We  define  the 
set DA  to be  the  domain  of  attraction  of  the  fixed  point  (  R)  of  (8), 
which  we  assume  to  be  unique.  That  is, DA consists  of  the  set  of  (P(O), LEAST-SQUARES  LEARNING  LAL 1 
R(O)) such  that  when  (0(0),  R(O))  C  DA,  then  (8)  implies  lima  ((t), 
R(t))  =  (W  /,  R/). 
We  use  a  set  of  six  assumptions  about  system  (6)-(7),  which  are 
described  in  the  Appendix.  Among  these,  the  first  five  are  in  the 
nature  of  regularity  conditions  that  are  easy  to verify  and  are  typically 
satisfied  for  the  kinds  of  applications  we  have  encountered.  It  bears 
mentioning  that  assumption  1, which  states  that  S has  a unique  fixed 
point,  could  be  relaxed  to  permit  multiple  fixed  points.  Then  our 
propositions  would  transform  to  statements  about  each  fixed  point  of 
Assumption  6 can  be considerably  more  difficult  to verify  than  1-5. 
Assumption  6  is  used  in  only  the  first  part  of  our  four-part  proposi- 
tion.  For  this  first  part,  we  also  use  the  following  assumption. 
ASSUMPTION  7.  For J =  a,  b, assume  that  D2J  is  closed,  that  DIJ is 
open  and  bounded,  and  that  0  C  D,  for  all  (0,r, R,,  Ihb Rb)  C  DIa  X 
Dlb.  Assume  that  the  trajectories  of  (8)  with  initial  conditions  (0,(O), 
Ra(O),  Pb(O),  Rb(O)) E  D2  x  D2X  never  leave  a closed  subset  of  DI,  X 
Dlb. 
We  now  state  proposition  1. 
PROPOSITION  1. Assume  that  (a,,  R,,  z,)  are  determined  by  (6)  and 
(7).  Assume  that  assumptions  1-5  are  satisfied. 
i)  Assume  also  that  assumptions  6 and  7 are  satisfied  and  that  DI ,  x 
Dlb  C  DA,  where  DA  is the  domain  of  attraction  of  (a/,  R/)  in  (8). 
Then  P [0,  W]  1. 
ii)  Let  7  of,  and  assume  that  M,  (0)  is positive  definite  for j =  a, b. 
Then  P[,  -r]  0. 
iii)  If h(R1,  Wt)  has  one  or  more  eigenvalues  with  strictly  positive  real 
part,  then  P[,  -*  W] =  0. 
iv)  h(1t,  R/)  has  (n, )2  +  (nb)2  repeated  eigenvalues  of  negative  one. 
The  remaining  eigenvalues  are  the  same  as those  of  the  following 
derivative  matrix: 
(a  0)col[Sa(I)  -  ]1 
V  anJCOI[Sb(P)  -  Oh]d  13"=13, 
This  concludes  the  proposition.5 
Statement  i  asserts  that  sufficient  conditions  for  It, -f  W  almost 
surely  as t -x  are  that  the  set DI,  x  Dlb  generated  in  the  projection 
facility  be  contained  in  DA  and  that  at  (and  close  to)  the  boundary  of 
DI,  X  Dlb,  the  differential  equation  (8)  have  trajectories  that  point 
5  Proposition  1 can  be  proved  by  retracing  the  steps  used  to  prove  propositions  1, 2, 
and  3  of  Marcet  and  Sargent  (in  press).  We  do  not  present  that  proof  here. 1312  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
toward  the  interior  of  Dil,  X  DIb.  Statement  ii  asserts  that  the  only 
possible  limit  points  of  the  learning  scheme  are  rational  expectations 
equilibria.  Statement  iii  asserts  sufficient  conditions  for  nonconver- 
gence  of  the  learning  scheme.  Statement  iv  implies  that  everything 
can  be  learned  about  the  local  stability  of  the  learning  scheme  by 
studying  the  differential  equation 
dt (  be  SI,  (P)  -  he  (b" 
Proposition  1 can  be  used  to  study  convergence  of  least-squares 
learning  in  the  context  of  a  variety  of  models  that  have  been  pro- 
posed.  Marcet  and  Sargent  (1987,  1988)  describe  applications  for 
several  such  models.  In  terms  of  the  literature  on  least-squares  learn- 
ing,  we  find  proposition  1 of  use  for  several  purposes.  First,  it some- 
times  makes  it possible  to  strengthen  results  that  have  been  obtained 
by other  means  (see,  e.g.,  the  analysis  of  Bray's  [1982]  model  in  Mar- 
cet  and  Sargent  [1987]).  Second,  application  of  the  proposition  can 
markedly  shorten  the  length  of  arguments  needed  to  establish  con- 
vergence  results  (again  see  Marcet  and  Sargent  [1987]).  Third,  the 
proposition  permits  a  unified  interpretation  in  terms  of  the  proper- 
ties  of  the  S(P)  operator  for  the  apparently  disparate  conditions  for 
convergence  that  previous  papers  have  discovered. 
In the  remainder  of  this  paper  we  focus  on  another  way that  propo- 
sition  1 can  be  used,  namely,  to  guide  the  computation  of  a rational 
expectations  equilibrium.  As  a  laboratory  for  our  study,  we  use  a 
model  of  Townsend  for  which  the  equilibrium  has  been  difficult  to 
formulate  and  to  compute  by  means  other  than  those  suggested  by 
proposition  1. 
III.  A Model  of  Townsend 
This  section  uses  an  algorithm  suggested  by proposition  1 to compute 
the  equilibrium  of  a version  of  Townsend's  (1983)  model.  We  adopt 
his  formulation  of  the  demand  and  cost  structure  but  reformulate  his 
way  of  modeling  firms'  forecasting  problems.  Townsend  formulates 
that  forecasting  problem  by imputing  to firms  more  understanding  of 
the  economic  structure  than  we  do.  He  models  each  firm  as knowing 
that  the  mean  beliefs  of  firms  in  other  industries  are  hidden  state 
variables  about  whose  laws  of  motion  the  firm  itself  forms  beliefs.  We 
model  the  firm  as  forecasting  its  own  price  by  using  a vector  autore- 
gression  that  includes  its  own  price,  the  price  of  the  other  industry, 
and  all  other  variables  in  its  information  set.  This  transformation  of 
Townsend's  "forecasting  the  forecasts  of  others"  into  the  problem  of LEAST-SQUARES  LEARNING  1313 
"forecasting  output  price  using  vector  autoregressions"  turns  out  to 
be  a  reformulation  that  leaves  the  economic  content  of  his  equilib- 
rium  concept  unaltered.  We  shall  return  to  this  point  later  in  this 
section.  We  now  turn  to describing  our  version  of  Townsend's  model. 
There  are  two  industries,  indexed  by  j  =  a,  b,  consisting  of  N 
identical  firms.  The  representative  firm  in  industry  j  has  objective 
function 
E)E  bt  Pj[fkjt  -  wujk,,  -  (2)(k ,+I  -  k/,)21  d >  0, 0 <  b <  1,  (10) 
where 
p,  =  -A/Kj,  +  uP,  A  >  0,()  >  0,  (11) 
K,  = NkM,  N  > 0,  (12) 
Uj,  =  0,  +  Ej1,  (13) 
Ot=  p0t-I  +  V,,  p  <  1,  (14) 
where  (E,  zl,) are  mutually  orthogonal  white  noises,  pf, is the  price  of 
output  in  industry  j at  t, k,, is  the  capital  stock  of  the  representative 
firm, f. k,, is the  firm's  output,  uJ, is a random  shock  to demand,  0, is a 
hidden  conmmion component  to the  demand  in industries  a and  b, and 
w1, is  a  serially  uncorrelated  rental  rate  on  capital  in  industry  j,  as- 
sumed  orthogonal  to  wi, for  i  4 j and  to  all  components  of  I-,, v,.  We 
have  omitted  constant  terms.  Firms  in  industry  a observe  the  history 
{P(, K,,  pi);  s '  t}.  Firms in industry b observe the history {pi,,  Kilo,  pa; 
S  t.  The  structure  of  demand  described  by  (13)-(14)  creates  a 
situation  in  which  price  in  the  other  market  is a  useful  signal  about 
future  movements  in  price  in  one's  own  market.  The  only  relation- 
ship  between  the  two  industries  is this  informational  link. 
We  assume  that  firms  in  each  industry  solve  their  optimization 
problem  by positing  that  the  variables  in their  information  sets  follow 
a  vector  autoregression.  r  They  use  this  vector  autoregression  to  solve 
the  "prediction  part"  of  the  linear-quadratic  control  problem  induced 
by (I(0).;  In  this  section,  we  assume  for  convenience  that  firms  in each 
industry  fit a first-order vector  autoregression  to  their  observables.7 
ti Because  ot  the  linear-(quadratic  structure  of  this  problem,  it separates  into  "control 
and  "prediction"  parts  (see  Sargent  1987,  chap.  14). 
[  This  is a restriction  and  causes  the  e(luilit)rium  that  we  compute  to deviate  from  the 
one  that  Iownsenld  wotild  recover  as he  drives  toward  infinity in his calculations in sec. 
8.  B1v modeling  agents  ats fitting  tith-order  vector  autoregressions  and  driving  n  to 
infinity,  we  woolul  recover  precisely  Townsend's  j  =  x  tloel.  We  shall  return  to  this 
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We  now  show  how  our  version  of  Townsend's  model  can  be 
mapped  into the setup of Section  II. The  state and noise of the model 
at t are specified  as 
Kat"  Eat 
U~~~l,6~ht 
z,  =  Kb  ,  =Et  Vt 
Ubt  Wat,  I 
LOf  Wbf-  I 
Firms in industryj  behave  competitively.  To  maximize  (10), firm 
needs  to forecast p,. We set 
[Kat  1  Kbtl 
Zat  =  Zt  =  Uat  'Zt 
=  Zdt  =  Ubt 
PhlPat] 
Thus  firm a observes  both Kt  and pat  (because pat is a linear combina- 
tion of K,, and u,,,), but only Pbi.  The  situation is reversed in industry b. 
Note  that 
Ka[t 
Ka t  1  0  0  0  0  Uat 
Uat  0  1  0  0  0  Kbt, 
Pbt  1  0  0  - Af  1  0]  Ubt 
Ot 
- 
which defines  e,  and  eh  via Zt  =  eazt  and  Zbt  =  ehZt.  Note  that pat  = 
Caz,  and Pbt  =  ChZht,  where c,  =  Cb  =  [-Af  1 0]. 
The  perceived  law of  motion  of  firm j is 
Z.  =  jZjt,,-  +  nb',  (15) 
where mt  is a vector white noise and  i is a 3  x  3 matrix. The firm uses 
the  perceived  law  of  motion  (15)  to  solve  its  Euler  equation  for  a 
decision  rule.  Following  Townsend  and  noting  that the  roots of  the 
polynomial  [1  +  (1  +  b-  ')L  +  b-  'L2]  are (1, b-  1), we can represent 
the  Euler equation  for firm j as 
kt + I=  k1t +  d'-f  >3  b1Etpjt+1+ 
-  -  ldzwt.  (16) 
i=o 
Using the perceived  law of motion  (15) to evaluate the expectations 
on  the  right side of  (16) gives  (see Sargent  1987) 
kt+I  = 
kit 
+  d- 1f(b  I,)  lejzt  -d- 
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which simplifies  to 
kjt+=  kkt  +  d-1fbcjI1[I  -  b,1-1ezt-d-1wjt.  (17) 
Multiplying  both  sides of  (17) by N and  using  (12) gives 
Kjt+=  Kjt +  Nd-1fbcjI([I  -  b,9]-lejzt  -  d-'Nwjt.  (18) 
Equations (15) and (18) permit us to define  the mapping  T(IP)  in the 
setup  of  Section  II. When  the perceived  laws of  motion  are given  by 
ia  and  fib in (15),  then  the actual law of  motion  for zt is given  by 
Kat  -T II  (0j,)  T12(,),  T13(0,(), T14 (P,  0  ~Kt  I 
Uat  0,  0,  0,  0,  P  Uat-1 
Kbt  T21(0b),  T22(0b),  T23(0b),  T24(Ib),  0  Kbt-I 
Ubt  0,  0,  0,  0,  p  bt-  I 
(19) 
0 ,  O.  O.  -d-  IN,  0  eat 
i1,  0,  I1,  0,  0  ENt 
+  0,  0,  0,  0,  -d-  N,  vt 
O,  0,  1,  0,  0  Wat- 
O.  O.  1,I,  O.  0  J  LWbt-  I 
where  the  mappings  Thk(pl)  are  given  by (18).  Equation  (19)  can be 
written as 
Zt  =  T(O3)zt- 1 +  V(Pl)Et,  (20) 
which is equation  (2). This model  is a special case of the model studied 
in Section  II. 
Because this is a big system-there  are 18 free parameters in 1,  and 
fib-we  have  not  calculated  analytically  the  eigenvalues  associated 
with the right side of (9), which would  govern  local stability of a least- 
squares learning  mechanism.  For a system  of  this size, that is an im- 
possible  task.  Instead,  a numerical  analysis of  the  differential  equa- 
tion (9) must be resorted  to. To  accomplish  this, one  needs  formulas 
for T(Pil)  and for the terms M,,,(P) -Mz,  (I),  which compose  Sj(p).  We 
use equation  (18) and the solution  of the discrete  Lyapunov  equation 
(3) to compute  these. 
In the context  of  a model  as complicated  as Townsend's,  proposi- 
tion  1 carries insights  about  alternative  ways of computing  a rational 
expectations  equilibrium.  We illustrate  these  by describing  some  cal- 
culations for Townsend's  model.  For several sets of parameter  values, 
we computed  a rational expectations  equilibrium  by numerically  solv- 1316  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
ing the "small" ordinary  differential  equation  (9), which we represent 
here  as 
d  6=S(6)-  (21) 
We used  a version  of  Euler's method  to solve  (21).  In particular,  we 
computed {I,} by solving 
Wt  =  Pit  -  +  y[S (Pt  - 1)  -  Pt  - I  ]  (22) 
for a small value of 'y  >  0. We then  used a finite difference  method  to 
evaluate  the  derivative  matrix  of  the  right  side  of  (21)  at the  fixed 
point  P/1  of  (21)  and  computed  the  eigenvalues  of  this  matrix.8  For 
each set of parameter values that we studied,  our calculations  indicate 
that the  real parts of  all eigenvalues  are  negative,  implying  that for 
these  parameter  values,  a  least-squares  learning  scheme  would  be 
locally stable. 
Tables  1-5  report  the results of our computations  for Townsend's 
model  with  five  settings  of  parameter  values.  common  for  all five 
tables are the following  parameter  values: N  =  A  =  f =  b =  =  1 
for j  =  a, b and  E&/ =  2, Ew,  E=Wb,.  Remaining  parameters  are 
described  in the tables. The  parameter  settings  induce  symmetry  be- 
tween the two industries,  so that Silf =  P~f  =  Sa,(P,/,  0itbf)  =  S b(t,,  13bl  1) 
We report  All  as well as T(P1). The  tables also report  the eigenvalues 
of  the  18  x  18 matrix 
-  Col[S(,)  -  s]  (23) 
For each set of parameter  values,  12 eigenvalues  of At equal  -  1. The 
remaining  six are always real and negative,  so that the conditions  for 
local stability of  the  learning  mechanisms  are satisfied. 
The  tables reveal that the coefficient  on KJ,  -  in the equilibrium law 
of motion  for KJ,  becomes  large'  when either (a) var(wp,)  is small (com- 
pare table  1 with 2 and table 3 with 4), (b) p is large (compare  table  1 
with 3 and  table 2 with 4), or (c) d is large  (compare  table 2 with 5). 
Informally,  the smaller is the variance of wj,,  the less the variation of K 
comes  from an idiosyncratic white noise, making K, more highly auto- 
correlated.  Also,  if  p is large,  there  occurs  more  persistence  in  the 
demand  shock, making K, more correlated  with K,_ ,.  Notice that the 
'  We imposed  accuracy levels of five significant digits in determining  whether  f, had 
converge(1 to S(IB,)  and  in computing  successive  difference  quotients  used  to approxi- 
mate the derivative  of S(P,). 
'The  coefficient  on K,, --  in the equilibrium  law of motion for K,, is the element  (1, 1) 
of  fr1  and  the elements  (1,  1) and  (3, 3) of  T(P). TABLE  1 
EQUILIBRIUM  OF  TOWNSEND'S  MODEL 
var(w,,)  =  1, p  =  .8,  d  =  1 
PI at  the  Fixed  Point  of  S 
.44556  .21912  .06645 
.10814  .45284  .12688 
.09530  .11556  .22658 
T-Mapping 
.44557  .21913  -  .06645  .06645  .00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .(0000  .80000 
-  .06645  .06645  .44557  .21913  .00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .80000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .80000 
Eigenvalues  of  Ak 
-5.297  -4.748  -  3.936  -  2.807  -3.801  -2.987  -1.000 
NOTE. 
z,  =  [K,,, u,,, Kb,, Ub,, et,. 
zt  =  [K,,,  U,,,  ph,], 
Zbt  =  [Kbt,  Ubt,  P,11] 
TABLE  2 
EQUILIBRIUM  OF  TOWNSEND'S  MODEL 
var(wit)  =  .1,  p  =  .8,  d  =  1 
at  the  Fixed  Point  of  S 
.61851  .17494  .11070 
.39798  .34513  .20993 
.04866  .10034  .15335 
7'-Mapping 
.61852  .17494  -.11070  .11070  ,.00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .80000 
-.11070  .11070  .61852  .17494  .00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .80000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .80000 
Eigenvalues  of  At 
-16.336  -11.400  -  3.280  -2.939  -  2.528  -2.456  -1.000 
NOTE. 
zt  =  [K,,t, U,,, Kb,, Ubt, st]', 
Zat =  [Ka,,, Ut,,  Pbt]. 
zbt  =  [Kb,,  Ubt,  P,1,] TABLE  3 
EQUILIBRIUM  OF  TOWNSEND'S  MODEL 
var(wj,)  =  1,  p  =  .95,  d  =  1 
01 at  the  Fixed  Point  of  S 
.49988  .27533  .05471 
.19088  .53446  .09758 
.11550  .12323  .22575 
T-Mapping 
.49989  .27534  -  .05472  .05472  .00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .95000 
-  .05472  .05472  .49989  .27534  .00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .95000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .95000 
Eigenvalues  of  At 
-8.352  -7.804  -  2.816  -  3.026  -  3.738  -3.795  -1.000 
NOTE. 
Z.  =  [Kat, ual,  Kbt, Uht, Otl', 
zut =  [K,t,  uat,  p,,, 
Zbt  =  [Kbt,  Ubt,  Pa] 
TABLE  4 
EQUILIBRIUM  OF  TOWNSEND'S  MODEL 
var(wj,) =  .1, p =  .95,  d =  1 
P,; at  the  Fixed  Point  of  S 
.72979  .19071  .07714 
.54594  .35923  .13792 
.08717  .06766  .14128 
T-Mapping 
.72979  .19071  -  .07714  .07714  .00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .95000 
-  .07714  .07714  .72979  .19071  .00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .95000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .95000 
Eigenvalues  of  At 
-63.531  -42.413  -3.291  -3.171  -2.712  -2.417  -1.000 
NOTE. 
zt  =  [Kt,  uat,  Kb,,  Ubt,  Ot], 
z,  =  [Kat,  Uat, Pb] 
Zbt  =  [Kbt,  Ubt,  pat]- LEAST-SQUARES  LEARNING  ijI 
TABLE  5 
EQUILIBRIUM  OF  TOWNSEND'S  MODEL 
var(wj,)  =  . 1, p  =  .8,  d =  2 
(a  at  the  Fixed  Point  of  S 
.67827  .12927  .08381 
.36737  .35693  .21510 
.05317  .12995  .20676 
T-Mapping 
.67828  .12927  -  .08382  .08382  .00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .80000 
-  .08382  .08382  .67828  .12927  .00000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .80000 
.00000  .00000  .00000  .00000  .80000 
Eigenvalues  of  At 
-9.861  -  7.471  -  2.688  -  2.382  -1.921  -  1.940  -1.000 
NOTE. 
z  =  [Kau, Ua,,  Kb,, Ubt,  Ot] 
Zau  =  [Kai,  Uut,  Pbt], 
Zb=  [Kb,,  Ubt, Pau 
stronger  is the dependence  of Kjt on Kjt- l, the larger  are the eigen- 
values in absolute  value. 
Notice  that 
a  co S()  =  A  +  I,  (24) 
where  I  is  the  identity  matrix.  Equation  (24)  implies  that  X is  an 
eigenvalue  of Al iff (X +  1) is an eigenvalue  of the left side of (24). For 
the calculations  reported  in tables  1-5,  several eigenvalues  of Al +  I 
are larger than one in absolute value. Therefore,  S is not a contraction 
mapping  (even  locally  about  of).  For  such  parameter  values,  itera- 
tions  of  the  kind  pursued  by  Townsend  (1983)  and  Evans  (1985), 
which  set  y  =  1 in  (21),  would  not  converge  for  our  model.  More 
generally,  in applications  of Euler's method  to (21) in order to find of, 
a good  choice  of  y depends  on the eigenvalues  of A.  Sometimes  one 
accelerates  convergence  by choosing  a large  y.  However,  when  the 
eigenvalues  of Al are large in absolute value, unless we use a very small 
y, the sequence  fit  starts to oscillate  explosively.  In computing  tables 
1-5,  we varied the choice  of y.  In table  1, y  =  .15 worked,  while for 
table 4 we needed  to use a y  =  .01.10 
10 With such settings  of -y, we started Euler's method  at many different  initial condi- 
tions. Provided  that  fi  was required  to stay in the set D,  =  $I  T(p) has all eigenvalues 1 q2O  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
We  close  this  section  by  returning  to  the  point  that  by  positing  that 
agents  fit  only  first-order  vector  autoregressions,  we  have  restricted 
agents'  perceived  laws  of  motion  relative  to  what  Townsend  had  in 
mind  (when  he  was  drivingj  toward  infinity  in  his  sec.  8 calculations). 
The  first-order  vector  autoregressions  are  too  short  in  the  sense  that 
in  equilibrium,  the  prediction  errors  from  these  vector  autoregres- 
sions  will  not  be  orthogonal  to  information  lagged  two  or  more  pe- 
riods.  In  effect,  Townsend  had  in  mind  permitting  agents  to  run 
infinite-order  vector  autoregressions,  so  that  agents  are  conditioning 
on  infinite  histories  of  zet  and  zi,.  There  are  two  ways  that  one  can 
think  of  modifying  the  present  setup  to  capture  the  idea  that  agents 
condition  on  longer  histories  than  we  have  permitted  them  to.  The 
first  is simply  to  let  agents  fit nth-order  vector  autoregressions  and  to 
think  of  increasing  n toward  infinity.''  The  second  is to  model  agents 
as making  forecasts  by fitting  finite-order  vector  autoregressive,  mov- 
ing  average  (ARMA)  processes.  We  conjecture  that  by  adopting  this 
second  path,  one  could  adapt  the  framework  of  this  paper  to compute 
exactly  the  equilibrium  that  Townsend  would  recover  by  driving  j 
toward  infinity.  We  also  suspect  that  by  specifying  a  recursive  es- 
timator  for  learning  the  vector  ARMA  process  (see  Ljung  and  Sdder- 
strom  1983),  a modified  version  of  proposition  1 of  this  paper  would 
apply  and  would  support  Townsend's  equilibrium  as  a limit  point. 
IV.  Extensions 
From  this  paper,  there  naturally  emerge  several  alternative  methods 
for  computing  a rational  expectations  equilibrium  for  a linear  model 
in  which  agents  have  limited  information.  Solving  the  differential 
equation  (9)  numerically  is one  such  method  since  the  limit  point,  if 
there  is one,  is a  rational  expectations  equilibrium.  Another  method 
consists  of  simulating  the  least-squares  learning  model  (6)-(7).  Once 
the  mappings  T and  V are  known,  the  model  with  learning  is very  easy 
to  simulate  since  these  equations  have  a  recursive  structure.  The 
method  of  simulating  the  learning  model  has  the  disadvantage  that  it 
requires  computing  a  realization  of  a  pseudo  random  process  for  a 
sufficiently  long  realization  to  assure  convergence.  In  practice,  it can 
be  difficult  to  assure  that  a realization  of  the  process  has  indeed  con- 
verged.  Against  this  difficulty  is balanced  the  reward  that  simulations 
less  than  one},  0,  always  converged  to  the  sane  rational  expectations  eqnilibri-mL11. 
Consequently,  we suspect  that, for Townsend's  model,  (9) is globally stable. 
' 
l  For reasons  related  to the infinite  regress  problems  of Townsend  ( 1  983),  it can be 
shown  that there  is no finite-order  vector antoregression  that is long  enough  to make 
the  prediction  errors  orthogonal  to  the  Hilbert  space  generated  by the  infinite  past 
history of  agents'  information. LEAST-SQUARES  LEARNING  1321 
can be easier  to implement  than  computing  solutions  to (9) because 
simulations  can be executed  without  finding  the moment  matrices of 
Zt. Further,  by expressing  P, as a version  of  the  Kalman  filter,  it is 
possible to compute  De,  without  inverting  any matrix, so that the com- 
puter can perform  each  iteration  very efficiently.  2 
Appendix 
We state six assumptions that we make about system (6)-(7). 
AssuMPTION  1. The operator S has a unique fixed point I3f  =  S(111)  that 
satisfies B1  E Ds, 
AssuMPTION  2. For IiE  D.,,  T is twice differentiable and V has one deriva- 
tive. 
AssuMPTION  3. The covariance  matrices  Mz  (li1)  are nonsingular  fb;rj=  a, 
b. 
AssuMPTION  4. Forj  a, b  and for all I, ot, > 0; ot, is increasing  in 1;  ot,  1 
as t -  so;  and 
lim sup tI(t,  -  (,ti  -II=  Ki <  o,  j =  a, b. 
AssuMPrION  5. The  vector  a,  consists  of  m stationary  random  variables;  e, 
is serially  independent.  Further,  E  eI  Et  <  xc for  all p  >  1, all  i  =  1.,  m. 
AssuMPTION  6.  There  exists  a subset  l(, of  the  sample  space  with  P(flo)  = 
1, four  random  variables  C,,(w),  Cb(w), G(,(w), Gb(w), and  a subsequence  {I;(w)} 
for  which 
zit,(wt)  I<  C,((w),  j  =  a,  b, 
|RP,  ()  I <  GI(w),  j  =  a,  b, 
for all w E  Q()  and  all /  =  1, 2,  .... 
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